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For years now, unionization has been under vigorous attack. Union 
membership has been steadily declining, and as a result, unions have 
lost much of their bargaining power and a great deal of their signifi-
cance as a political force. If these trends continue – and at this point 
we have no reason to believe that they will not – it may not be long 
before unions lose whatever remains of their ability to protect work-
ing people from economic and personal abuse. In the Name of Liberty 
responds to this worrying state of affairs by presenting a new argu-
ment for unionization, one that does not depend on disputed claims 
that unionization has good effects, but instead derives a right to uni-
versal unionization in both the private and the public sector from 
concepts of liberty that we already accept. In short, In the Name of 
Liberty reclaims the argument from liberty from the political right 
and shows how liberty not only requires the unionization of every 
workplace but also how it supports a wide variety of other progressive 
policies that are also now the subject of frequent attack.
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1Introduction
For some time now, union membership has been steadily declining. After 
reaching a peak of 33 percent in the United States in 1953, unionization hit 
10.7 percent in 2016, its lowest level in one hundred years, and it shows no 
sign of rising.1 In the United Kingdom, union membership is now half of 
what it was in 1979, or about the level it was just after World War II.2 In 
many other liberal capitalist democracies, unionization rates have been fall-
ing steadily as well.3 In part this decline is due to the success that unions have 
had in establishing a more just baseline for the treatment of all workers, for 
this makes joining a union seem less necessary for current employees. In part 
the decline is due to shifts in the nature of the relevant economies, in which 
large numbers of union jobs in heavy manufacturing have been shifted to 
less-unionized countries and replaced by jobs in industries that are more 
difficult to unionize. In part it is due to local outsourcing of what were high- 
paying unionized jobs to smaller, exploitive, currently nonunionized contrac-
tors who are also more difficult to organize. And in part this decline results 
from technological advances that have allowed many previously unionized 
jobs to be performed by robots.4 But especially in the United States, this 
decline is also in large part the result of continuous attacks made against the 
very idea of unionization over the last thirty-plus years,5 attacks that have 
been increasing in both frequency and vigor for some time now6 and which 
are increasing even further under the administration of President Trump.7 In 
any event, regardless of the cause of this decline, union membership is now 
becoming sufficiently small that unions may soon lose their ability to ade-
quately protect workers from economic and personal abuse (if they haven’t 
already) and may even lose their significance as a political force.8
Not surprisingly, this decline in unionization has been accompanied by a dra-
matic rise in the share of income going to the top one percent, a lengthy stagna-
tion in real wages for everybody else, a steep rise in unemployment followed by 
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the replacement of high-paying permanent jobs providing good benefits with 
low-paying temporary ones providing no benefits as the unemployment rate 
has come down, and various other negative turns in the economic situation 
of masses of Americans, as well as the citizens of many other liberal capitalist 
democracies.9 Of course, this sorry state of economic affairs is the product of 
many causes, not just one, and identifying all the contributing causes much less 
the precise contribution of each is a difficult exercise – indeed, the exact causal 
story behind this negative turn in so many measures of economic well-being 
may never be entirely clear. But as we shall see, there is strong evidence that 
many of our current economic problems here in the United States and, by con-
tagion, in other parts of the liberal capitalist world have at least been partially 
caused by the decline in unionization.10
In two previous books, I have discussed these rising economic problems 
(and particularly the economic problems of inequality and unemployment) 
and proposed new ways of assessing and implementing our moral obliga-
tion to address them.11 In this book, I turn to the problem of unionization. 
But the idea is not simply to propose reversing the decline in unionization as 
an (additional) remedy to the economic problems of inequality and unem-
ployment. Indeed, because it makes wages higher than they would otherwise 
be, unionization is sometimes claimed to be a cause of unemployment, for 
employers will hire fewer workers if they are more expensive. Unionization 
is also sometimes claimed to be a cause of inequality, for if fewer work-
ers have jobs, more people will be poorer, even if the income gap between 
those who are working and the rich is somewhat smaller.12 There is a great 
deal of empirical evidence showing that neither of these consequentialist 
claims are true (more on this later), but whether they are true is irrelevant to 
the argument I will be making here. In this book, I will be arguing for union-
ization in its own right – that is, I will be presenting a moral argument for 
unionization that does not depend on the effects of unionization on inequal-
ity or unemployment, although I shall do my best to outline these effects 
whenever possible. Instead, I shall be arguing that unionization is required 
not because it is good, but because it is right. This, after all, is exactly what 
those who have been arguing against unionization have been doing all these 
years – defusing the argument that unions raise wages and benefits, create job 
security, and improve working conditions by claiming that unionization, and 
especially what they derogatively refer to as “compulsory” unionization, is 
an infringement of liberty; therefore, the effects of unionization on the good 
of workers, or even the common good, are morally irrelevant because liberty 
cannot be justifiably infringed for any of these reasons.
Of course, the anti-union argument from liberty can take a variety of 
forms. Sometimes it is expressed as a straightforward argument derived from 
a supposed general right to liberty.13 As we shall see, however, the concept of 
liberty is not at all as straightforward as those who make this argument pre-
tend, and those who raise this objection to unionization rarely acknowledge 
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that various versions of liberty might be involved here or clarify which version 
they are referring to when they refer to liberty. Sometimes the argument from 
liberty is expressed as a more particularized argument regarding freedom of 
association. Here the claim is that even if voluntary unionization may accord 
with freedom of association (the liberty to associate with whomever we wish), 
compulsory unionization is contrary to it, and therefore workers cannot be 
compelled to join a union or pay dues even if they benefit from the activities of 
the union.14 In the public sector, the argument from liberty is also sometimes 
expressed as an argument for free speech (the liberty to speak our mind), the 
claim being that under the First Amendment, public sector workers cannot be 
compelled to pay union dues if this compels them to pay for speech with which 
they do not agree or, even more nefariously, if such a payment would actually 
constitute speech with which they disagree.15 And finally, in the public sec-
tor once again, the argument from liberty is sometimes expressed as a claim 
that unionization is leading to the runaway growth of government, bankrupt-
ing us, and otherwise undermining our democracy, which is said to be the 
ultimate assurance of our liberty. I shall say much more about each of these 
arguments from liberty in the pages that follow. But for now, I simply want 
to point out what all these arguments have in common: because liberty, either 
in general or in one or more of its constituent parts, is a right, the argument 
goes, it renders consequentialist arguments for the common good irrelevant, 
for rights cannot be overridden by consequentialist concerns.
Indeed, this latter argument – the argument that rights cannot be infringed 
even if the consequences of doing so would be better in some sense than not 
doing so – enjoys wide support on both sides of the political spectrum. For 
example, Robert Nozick, one of the leading libertarian theorists of the twen-
tieth century, describes rights as “side-constraints,” meaning they may not 
be justifiably infringed for consequentialist reasons even if this would make 
rights violations in general or violations of the specific right in question less 
common.16 And on the other side of the political spectrum, John Rawls, one 
of the leading liberal egalitarians of the twentieth century, and one of the most 
influential liberal voices on equality and distributive justice ever, criticizes 
utilitarianism extensively for putting the good before the right and argues that 
the right must instead be put before the good.17 So the anti-union argument 
from liberty, if sound, presents a formidable rebuttal to any consequentialist 
arguments presented by the union movement.
Note that the anti-union argument from liberty, while not usually denying 
that workers have a moral right to join unions and that unions therefore have a 
right to exist, effectively makes these rights largely worthless by blocking com-
pulsory unionization and eliminating mandatory dues and, in the public sector, 
by barring unions from bargaining collectively. The latter prevents unions from 
delivering one of the primary benefits that unionization is designed to provide, 
therefore dramatically reducing the attraction of becoming a member of the 
union, and the former does the same in both the public and the private sector 
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by depriving unions of the financial resources necessary to organize workers 
and effectively advance their interests with employers and with the government 
more generally.18 The idea behind limiting what unions can do is to “corral 
the beast”; the idea behind depriving unions of the ability to collect dues from 
all those who benefit from union services even if they are not members is to 
“starve the beast,” a tactic that has already been used by those on the right for 
some time with much success in an attempt to cut government programs that 
they don’t like but which are too popular to be attacked directly.19 Both tactics 
are designed to ensure that the rate of unionization will drop and remain low 
in both the private and the public sector and that union influence will become 
and remain politically inconsequential.20
One of the reasons why this anti-union strategy has been so successful is 
that while there has of course been much pro-union material generated over 
the years by those in the union movement and those who are sympathetic to 
it, the overwhelming majority of the positive arguments for unionization have 
almost all been presented in purely consequentialist terms. In other words, 
the argument for unionization typically proceeds by making empirical claims 
about the positive effects of unionization in both the private and the public 
sector and then by making the moral claim that these empirical effects pro-
mote the good of workers and in turn the common good.21 Sometimes, of 
course, the typical argument for unionization also relies in part on an argu-
ment from right and not just an argument from consequences, these rights 
being the right to freedom of association and the right to equality. Freedom of 
association, however, does not turn out to do much work, for despite the fact 
that it is widely acknowledged to give workers the right to voluntarily form 
associations if they want to, it does not give these associations the right to 
do anything, such as bargain collectively, strike, or even collect dues. In any 
event, the dramatic decline in unionization demonstrates that the minimal 
protection provided by the right of free association alone is not having much 
of an effect. The right to equality, in turn, is more of a concept than a right – 
it is difficult to show how the right to equality should be cashed out. At best, 
it merely provides a connection between the equalizing effects of unioniza-
tion on economic inequality and the non-consequentialist moral claim that 
economic inequality is a moral bad. So while the argument from equality 
is an argument from right, it is an argument from right that is nevertheless 
dependent on controversial consequentialist claims.
More importantly, perhaps, those who claim that economic inequality is a 
moral bad are rarely strict egalitarians – that is, few people claim that economic 
inequality is always a moral bad. Most people are liberal egalitarians – that is, 
they claim that economic inequality is sometimes a moral bad and sometimes 
not, and they offer “sorting principles” designed to help us tell the difference. 
Rawls’s difference principle is one such principle, the various principles offered 
by those who are collectively described as “luck egalitarians” are another, and 
there are others still.22 Under the difference principle, in order to determine 
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whether a particular form of economic inequality is unjust, we must determine 
whether it works to the advantage of the worst-off members of society.23 Under 
luck egalitarianism, we must determine whether the economic inequality at 
issue is a product of luck or choice.24 Whether we are trying to predict the 
effect on an inequality on the worst off, or trying to determine whether an 
inequality is caused by luck or choice, however, the relevant borderlines are 
subject to a great deal of indeterminacy; there is a lot to argue about before we 
can come to any firm conclusion under either theory about the injustice of any 
particular inequality. This makes both theories amenable to being hijacked by 
the anti-egalitarian right through restrictive interpretations of the key working 
concepts that these theories each employ.25 Modestly and highly egalitarian 
interpretations of these theories are, of course, also possible, but the arguments 
for any particular interpretation is controversial given the indeterminacy 
inherent in each principle. Even if unionization does reduce economic 
inequality, this does not by itself establish that the economic inequality that 
would otherwise prevail is an injustice under either of these theories – this 
has to be argued for separately. And under either of these theories, the road 
from the general concept of equality to the applied conclusion that anti-union 
legislation is unjust because it supports inequality is lengthy and complex.26
There is yet another problem with the argument from equality. The argu-
ment from equality is not an argument from right in the same way as the 
argument from liberty, at least when the inequality at issue is economic 
inequality. Unlike violations of equality such as those that result from vari-
ous kinds of invidious discrimination based on race, ethnicity, age, religion, 
or the like, restrictions on unionization would be a distributive injustice and 
not a commutative injustice even if they do produce or exacerbate unjust 
economic inequality. In other words, the injustice here would be a social 
problem that we as a society have a moral duty to remedy in some broad 
sense but not one that necessarily imposed a duty on some individual or 
entity to cease engaging in the conduct that contributed to this problem 
and remedy past violations. Individuals have a duty to cease committing 
an injustice and to remedy injustices they significantly contributed to cre-
ating only when they commit commutative violations of individual rights. 
This makes the argument from equality, at least in its economic form, a 
potentially weaker argument than the argument from liberty, for the latter 
purports to be an argument from individual right – that is, from commuta-
tive injustice.27 It is usually very clear what could be done to prevent a com-
mutative injustice from arising; what could be done to prevent a distributive 
injustice from arising is much more open to debate. There are probably a 
variety of possible remedies here, and it is probably the case that no one of 
these is unquestionably better than the others, leaving the possibility that 
even if restrictions on unionization contribute to distributive injustice, they 
may still be able to remain intact because the resulting injustice can be dealt 
with in some other way.
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The argument from liberty, in contrast, is much more simple, direct, and 
quick. Whereas the argument from equality arguably takes the utilitar-
ian conception of the common good and puts a controversial conception of 
equality in its place, the argument from liberty seems to depend on empirical 
claims (to the extent it depends on empirical claims at all) that are far easier 
to understand and not controversial at all. That is, while the argument from 
equality is an argument from right, the right here depends on a conception of 
what equality is with inherently controversial empirical contentions built into 
it. The argument from liberty, in contrast, is far less controversial, for it seems 
to be relatively clear what liberty is and is not, and in any event, the asser-
tion that liberty is infringed does not seem to depend on disputed empirical 
claims to the same extent. Many people no doubt find this appealing, which is 
why the argument from liberty is so often used to attack progressive propos-
als based on the argument from equality, no matter what the subject matter 
of those proposals may be.28 But for present purposes, the most important 
feature of the argument from liberty is that it constitutes a direct argument 
against unionization in general and against the mandatory payment of the 
dues even if some form of unionization is allowed. None of the arguments 
for unionization that I have mentioned so far – not the argument from conse-
quences nor the argument from freedom of association nor the argument from 
equality – constitute an argument for the contrary position.
I should note, however, that my own theory of exploitation does present a 
more determinate conception economic inequality and defines exploitation as 
both a distributive and commutative injustice, so not all conceptions of eco-
nomic inequality suffer from the disadvantages I have outlined above.29 But 
my point here is not that the argument from equality is inherently disadvan-
tageous, merely that the currently most used arguments from equality have 
problems that are difficult to uncontroversially overcome. And while I could 
derive an argument for unionization and even for the mandatory payment of 
dues from my theory of exploitation, perhaps one that is even more direct than 
the usual arguments from equality, I will not attempt to do so here because, 
even if I did so, all the only thing this would establish in the eyes of most of 
those who are anti-union is that, in this instance, equality and liberty happen 
to conflict.
Establishing such a conflict has long been a tactic of the right,30 and it 
has been a mistake by those on the left to cede the argument from liberty to 
those on the other side. For if equality and liberty do conflict, it is difficult 
to explain why equality and not liberty should be given priority in our moral 
deliberations. Even Rawls concedes that liberty – or at least certain “basic” 
kinds of liberty – has priority over equality.31 In fact, Rawls goes even further 
than this, for he contends that protecting basic liberty from infringement has 
lexical priority over addressing economic inequality, meaning that no amount 
of basic liberty, no matter how small, may be traded off for an improvement 
in economic inequality, no matter how large.32 Moreover, even if we were to 
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reject the Rawlsian position and claim that all forms of equality and all forms 
of liberty are to be given equal weight, it would still be difficult to explain why 
the argument from equality should be treated as decisive in determining what 
we should do. At most, relying on the argument from equality and the conse-
quentialist claims on which it is effectively, although not expressly, based to 
counteract an argument from liberty produces a moral standoff. Such a lack of 
moral clarity is simply not sufficient if we are going to convince anyone whose 
mind may still be open that supporting unionization is a moral imperative in 
the circumstances in which we now find ourselves.
Accordingly, my objective in this book is to reclaim the argument from 
 liberty from the anti-union movement. This means that my main focus in 
this book is the right to liberty and the various subsidiary rights that the right 
to liberty is said to generate. I will, of course, be talking about the right to 
 equality too, as well as exploring the usual consequentialist claims about the 
effects of unionization and the relationship between these effects and the good 
of  workers and the common good. But the primary focus of each of the essays in 
this book is the right to liberty and how we might derive a right to unionization 
from it. And when I speak of a right to unioniziation, I mean a right to  universal 
unionization, not merely a right to unionization when certain contingencies are 
met. That is, I will be arguing that justice, and especially that component of 
justice that protects liberty, requires all private and all public sector workers to 
be unionized – this is not something that is open to resolution by majority vote 
of either workers or the electorate at large and does not depend on whether the 
employer has agreed to this as part of the collective bargaining process once a 
workplace has been unionized.
Given my objectives, it is important to understand that this book is a 
work of political theory. Although there is an enormous amount of literature 
available on unionization, and there is obviously a very strong connection 
between unionization and political activism and various aspects of public 
policy, very little of the literature available on unionization consist of works of 
political theory, at least among liberal political theorists (and by “liberal” here 
I mean all political theorists who draw their inspiration from the Enlightenment, 
including those on the moderate right as well as the moderate left).33 Instead, 
liberal political theorists mostly treat unionization as a specialty reserved for 
those in other disciplines, such as industrial relations or labor economics. There 
is certainly much about unionization that these specialties can explore and help 
us to explain, and I will rely on a great deal of this literature in making my 
argument in this book. But given the direct relevance of both equality and 
liberty (two of the principal concerns of political theory) to unionization and 
vice versa, we have reason to be concerned that there is relevant expertise 
here that has not been sufficiently brought to bear, especially because the 
specialties of industrial relations and labor economics are each driven 
primarily by empirical questions and not by questions of justice, equality, and 
liberty. These latter questions have empirical elements too, of course, but they 
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also require a sophisticated understanding of how to reason about political 
morality and how questions about these various aspects of political morality 
should be understood. Much confusion has been generated and continues to 
persist as a result of the general neglect of the issue of unionization by liberal 
political theorists. As I will attempt to show in this book, there is much that the 
approach and techniques of political theory can contribute to an understanding 
of unionization on both the theoretical and the practical level, and without such 
contributions, it is unlikely that any society will ever have enough information 
and understanding to get the issue correct.
Given my approach, it may be helpful to say a little more at this point 
about the role that empirical arguments will play in the essays in this book. 
I have said that I will primarily be making an argument from right – the 
right to liberty – rather than an argument from consequences, when arguing 
for universal unionization. But I am not suggesting that we can distinguish 
between acts and omissions that are morally right and those that are morally 
wrong completely independent of their actual, expected, or possible effects. 
Consequences always matter. As Rawls noted in the course of articulating his 
own argument from right, “All ethical doctrines worth our consideration take 
consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would 
simply be irrational, crazy.”34 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how one could 
even think, much less derive an ethical position, without some consideration 
of how the available courses of action might affect the existing state of affairs, 
and to consider this, it requires not only an understanding of human nature 
and circumstances but also an understanding of the principles of causation 
and how those principles might operate in the particular case at hand. The dif-
ference between an argument from right and an argument from consequences 
is therefore not that one considers consequences and the other doesn’t – it is 
simply that, in an argument from right, the expected consequences are not the 
only factor to be considered. Certain pre-existing principles matter too. An 
argument from right will therefore sometimes recommend we do or refrain 
from doing something even though we are fairly certain some other course of 
action would, in some sense, produce “better” consequences.
Nevertheless, it is also important to realize that rights are not a priori 
conceptions that exist independently of facts about the world. If we are to 
determine whether a right has been infringed, for example, we must take into 
account various facts about causation, about human nature, and about the 
state of the world. But one of the most important benefits of employing an 
argument from right is that even when questions about these various empirical 
matters are vigorously disputed and these disputes are not likely to be resolved 
to a reasonable degree of certainty anytime soon, an argument from right 
can still provide categorical recommendations on what to do. In other words, 
arguments from right can give us recommendations on what to do under what 
game theorists call “conditions of risk and uncertainty,” whereas arguments 
from consequences can only do this when the relevant probabilities of the 
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various possible outcomes – that is, the consequences – are not themselves 
reasonably disputed.35 When these are reasonably disputed, basing a recom-
mendation for action or belief on an argument from right may make it seem 
like consequences do not matter, but they do matter. They are still taken into 
consideration, they are simply not treated as determinative. Whatever argu-
mentative power they may have or would have if they could be resolved one 
way or the other is accordingly supplemented and, in certain cases, overcome 
by an argument derived through some other method.36
One such other method (there might be others still) involves beginning with 
something we embrace as what we might call a fundamental presupposition – 
something that establishes the framework for moral reasoning to take place 
rather than something that is derived by using that framework once it is in 
place.37 All moral argument has to begin somewhere, but this starting point 
cannot be argued for morally, it can merely be accepted, for at this point 
there are no moral arguments to make. Liberty is such a fundamental presup-
position, one that is accepted by both the pro-union left and the anti-union 
right. The argument from liberty therefore provides a basis on which each 
side can meaningfully engage the other. Of course, fundamental presupposi-
tions are general concepts, not detailed conceptions,38 and therefore need to 
be given further specificity to be operationalized; that is, they need to be fur-
ther refined before they will generate recommendations as to what we should 
actually do about the problems that confront us in the real world. This can 
often if not always and perhaps even almost always be done in various ways. 
We therefore need to know more about what the concept means and what our 
understanding of its demands entails before we apply it. And this, in turn, 
means we often have to make judgments about the effect of certain kinds of 
acts and omissions on certain aspects of our lives. This is another sense, then, 
in which even an argument from right, like the argument from liberty, must 
contain elements of an argument from consequences. But once again, this 
does not make the two forms of argument equivalent. In an argument from 
consequences, we have to assemble our conception of the common good from 
a great many components of that good. What to include in this assemblage 
and how to prioritize different elements of it when they happen to conflict 
is often highly controversial. In an argument from right, we have only one 
particular aspect of individual life in mind. We call this an individual right 
because we judge it important enough to pursue regardless of the effect of this 
on the common good. While empirical matters may be relevant when deciding 
whether this right is being infringed or whether something further must be 
done to protect it, this does not make the underlying grounds of the argument 
consequentialist. Accordingly, saying that I am making an argument from 
right does not mean that I have strayed from this approach whenever I con-
sider empirical matters, especially those that are not reasonably disputable, in 
constructing that argument or defending it from attack. Facts of this nature 
are indeed commonly included in arguments from right of all sorts.
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I also want to say something about the distinction between what is called 
“ideal” and “non-ideal” theory, for this also has an effect on the extent to 
which empirical matters are relevant to my argument. All moral theories, 
whether they are arguments from right or arguments from consequences, have 
to consider basic facts about human nature, circumstances, and the methods 
of human reasoning. These include a scarcity of resources, the fact that we 
tend to care more about ourselves than other people (usually referred to as 
“limited altruism”), our tendency to rely on certain irrational heuristics and 
to harbor certain biases when evaluating our reasons for action or belief, and 
the resulting difficulty this all presents for successfully organizing collective 
action and producing public goods. These basic facts about human nature, 
circumstances, and reasoning are in some sense contingent; that is, they could 
be different if humans were to transform their basic nature or circumstances 
or methods of reasoning. Sometimes such a transformation might be possible, 
at least in small ways, without making us into different kinds of beings living 
in a different kind of world altogether. Because of this, philosophers often do 
what they call “ideal theory,” that is, they assume some kind of transforma-
tion has or at least could take place. Sometimes this kind of theory is entirely 
unrealistic given where we are now and therefore provides no real guidance 
as to how we should behave in or what we should believe about the world 
in which we currently live. But sometimes we can derive important insights 
into our world from considering what would happen if we or our world were 
more ideal in certain ways.39 In these cases, the ideal does not have to be 
attainable; it is simply used to clarify our thinking on certain problems that 
present themselves to us in the real world. The first essay in this volume is 
an attempt to derive such insights from a hypothetical thought experiment 
about a world that does not exist and is not likely to exist anytime soon, 
which makes it, I suppose, an exercise in ideal theory. The other two, in con-
trast, are exercises in “non-ideal” theory; that is, they take the world as we 
find it. Describing how the world operates is accordingly more important in 
these later essays, but that does not make the arguments presented in them 
any less arguments from right – the unfortunate judgmental overtones of the 
label “non-ideal” notwithstanding. Each of these essays looks at fundamental 
principles to which we claim to be committed and derives what I believe are 
feasible and practical recommendations as to how we should think about 
universal unionization. Consequences matter in these essays, and it is impor-
tant to get our understanding of these correct, but this is not the only thing 
that matters. Therefore, the arguments presented in these latter essays are still 
arguments from right that are meant to have real purchase even if some of the 
connections between the right to liberty and various kinds of conduct raise 
empirical questions. In cases where the answers to these empirical questions 
are not reasonably disputable, however, there is nothing about taking these 
facts as given that transforms an argument otherwise based on right into 
something else. What I avoid in these essays is relying on consequentialist 
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factual assertions that remain highly controversial and unresolved, the kind 
of factual assertions that typically make up a great part of an argument about 
the common good.
Also note that my argument proceeds on what we might call the institu-
tional level. By this I mean that it is about whether unions are a kind of asso-
ciation essential to ensure background justice in our society. I shall say much 
more about this later, but briefly the idea is that unionization and therefore 
the core functions that an association must perform to be a union are not open 
for prohibition the way noncore functions are. Of course, both core and non-
core functions may be regulated, but I will make no attempt here to develop 
a fine-tuned set of regulations dictating what unions should and should not 
be allowed to do or even discuss how their core functions might be regulated 
once universal unionization is recognized as an essential principle of justice 
in a particular liberal capitalist democracy. I shall stop once the institutional 
argument is complete. Details such as the nature and extent of appropriate 
post-institutional regulation are simply to be decided according to the politi-
cal preferences of the electorate once the basic elements of unionization are 
established and protected from direct or indirect attack.40 What I argue for 
in this book is the right for unions to exist, in both the private and the public 
sector, to bargain collectively for their members, to represent their members 
in disputes with management, to lobby government for legislation in their 
members’ interests, and to negotiate for and fully enforce what are commonly 
called union shop agreements – agreements that require all employees to join 
the union upon being hired and pay dues designed to cover the costs of the 
various services that the union ultimately provides.
But beyond this, and subject to certain feasibility constraints, I also argue 
that every firm must have a union, and every government employer too, and 
that such unions are to be treated as a basic institution that we all bear an 
obligation to provide rather than something that employees bear the initial 
burden of organizing before it may come into existence. After all, even the 
“Powell Memo,” the 1971 document that is frequently characterized as setting 
forth the blueprint for the conservative right’s subsequent attack on a wide 
variety of economic regulations and progressive policies and institutions in 
the name of freedom (then a Richmond, Virginia corporate lawyer, Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr. would later ascend to the Supreme Court following nomination by 
President Nixon), describes labor unions and collective bargaining as among 
our “essential freedoms.”41 Extending Powell’s argument only a little bit, 
I simply contend that in order to ensure that these essential freedoms (which 
are themselves necessary guarantors of other essential freedoms) are not as a 
practical matter rendered illusory or toothless, unionization must be universal – 
that is, all employees, private and public, must be represented by a union, 
whether they would prefer to act exclusively on their own or not – for univer-
sal unionization is a necessary element of the background circumstances that 
every liberal capitalist society must provide in order for it to be just.
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Obviously, the argument for universal unionization takes us quite a ways 
beyond the current status quo in which unions are permitted in the workplace 
(if at all) only after a certain percentage of the workforce votes for them and, in 
right-to-work states, collectively negotiated agreements that require all employ-
ees to join the relevant union are impermissible even so. Indeed, even some of 
those who are sympathetic to my objectives may worry that I am arguing for 
changes that are politically unachievable under current conditions. But if this 
is what morality requires, then saying that achieving this will be difficult is not 
a counter to my argument. Although the ultimate claim I present in this book 
is that universal unionization is morally required, this does not mean that my 
argument is irrelevant to beginning that journey by struggling first toward less 
ambitious short-term goals such as the elimination of right-to-work laws and 
restrictions on what can be the subject of collective bargaining agreements. On 
the contrary, my argument should provide a more effective basis for challeng-
ing these union-suppressing laws. The long-term goal of requiring all firms of 
at least a certain size to have a unionized workforce is also not as unachievable 
as some may think, for as we shall see, something very close to this is already 
in place in many liberal capitalist European states.
To make my argument, I proceed by presenting three separate essays, each 
of which is conceived of as being able to stand on its own, but each of which 
also establishes an essential part of my overall claim. The essays can be read 
in any order, although the order they are offered here seems to me to be the 
most effective when viewed from the perspective of the whole. In any event, 
taken together these essays provide a comprehensive defense of my principle 
of universal unionization of both the private and the public sector. In the first 
essay, I deal with the question of whether universal unionization violates what 
are commonly thought of as libertarian rights. This argument is primarily 
directed at those who think of themselves as political libertarians or economic 
neoliberals or, as is most commonly the case, both. The idea is to show that 
even in a libertarian utopia, where liberty is given priority over everything 
else, unions would arise in both the private and the public sector and would 
eventually negotiate agreements with the relevant employers requiring all new 
hires to join the union and pay dues as a condition of their continued employ-
ment. This essay is designed to establish that unionization – even when it leads 
to such agreements – is not a violation of anyone’s right to liberty, and that 
such agreements would naturally arise out of free market transactions in any 
society that ensured that this market was indeed free.
In the second essay, which is longer and more complex, I move beyond 
the argument that unions would only arise naturally in a free market society 
and should be able to negotiate union shop agreements if they wish. Here, 
I argue that at least in the private sector, the union is a basic institution in 
a liberal capitalist democracy. That is, in a society in which the basic form 
of business organization is the firm, unionization in the private sector is not 
simply optional – it is one of the background circumstances necessary for a 
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liberal capitalist society to be just. Here, I am using the term “liberal” in its 
broadest, children-of-the-Enlightenment sense, not just as a shorthand way 
of referring again to libertarianism, as the term “liberal” is sometimes used 
in continental Europe. By liberal I mean to include not only liberal egali-
tarians, prioritarians, sufficientarians, left-libertarians, and others on the 
moderate left, but also right-libertarians, traditional conservatives, and 
others on the moderate right, who are nevertheless liberals in the broad, 
history-of-political-philosophy sense rather than the man-on-the-street 
sense of the term. In other words, the purpose of this essay is to address all 
those who find the anti-union argument from liberty persuasive no matter 
what liberal political theory they happen to embrace. In any event, to make 
this argument, I discuss what the idea of a basic institution means, how 
we tell whether a particular institution is basic, and what flows from this 
determination once it is made with regard to unions. I also show that this 
argument is not as radical as it may seem, for something very much like 
universal unionization has already been recognized in a number of highly 
successful liberal capitalist democracies. Finally, I discuss how the idea of 
the union as a basic institution might be implemented and what kinds of 
issues would remain to be decided by post-institutional regulation.
In the third essay, I turn my attention to public sector unions and address 
the argument that, regardless of whether we think that unions in the private 
sector are a basic institution, the background circumstances in the public sec-
tor are different and therefore a similar conclusion should not apply. I address 
the various arguments raised in support of this claim and show that while the 
circumstances are indeed different in the private and the public sector, they 
are not materially different – meaning that the differences do not suggest that 
our conclusion about the necessity of universal unionization in the private 
sector does not apply. I then go on to address various other supposedly liberty-
based arguments against public sector unionization, including that it inappro-
priately promotes the growth of government, that it puts essential services at 
risk, that collective bargaining by public employees is unfair to the public, that 
public sector unionization is undemocratic, that it is bankrupting us, and that 
it somehow constitutes a violation of free speech. What we end up with then, 
after the completion of the third essay, is an argument for a modern, liberal 
capitalist society in which unionization is not merely optional but required in 
both the private and public sector, where collective bargaining, being one of 
the core functions of unions, cannot be restricted or eliminated in either sec-
tor, and where union shop arrangements must be honored should the parties 
collectively agree to them. Beyond this, the details of what unions can and 
cannot do and how they must be organized are up for post-institutional regu-
lation, just as is the case with firms and agencies of government.
In the course of presenting the arguments that I make in these essays, I will, 
of course, talk a great deal about liberty. It may be helpful at the outset to note 
that the term “liberty” is surprisingly general and vague – it can and often is 
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used to refer to what are actually some very different aspects of our life in the 
world. In one of the most famous essays of the twentieth century, the political 
philosopher and historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin argued that the various ways 
in which people have spoken about liberty over the centuries could be broken 
down into two general categories or concepts: negative liberty and positive 
liberty.42 By using these terms, however, Berlin was not trying to suggest that 
negative liberty is “bad” and that positive liberty is “good.” Negative liberty is 
negative only in the sense that it protects people from interference – it focuses 
on whether people are restrained in some way from doing what they would 
otherwise have the capacity to do. Positive liberty is positive, in contrast, only 
in the sense that it “posits,” or proposes, that certain kinds of actions must be 
done rather than simply may be done if one is to be truly free. Berlin’s essay 
and especially his use of these terms has shaped the discussion of liberty ever 
since, but now a third concept, called republican liberty, has joined the two 
concepts Berlin identified.43 Republican liberty is freedom from the arbitrary 
will of another, a form of domination that is argued to be demeaning, dehu-
manizing, and dispiriting and, if wide-ranging enough, tantamount to slavery. 
Republican liberty is republican, however, not because it is the kind of liberty 
that members of the GOP embrace (they may or may not), but because it is 
derived from what are thought by some to be the principles of the republics 
of ancient Greece and Rome. In any event, each of these concepts of liberty 
is very different from the others and is best used to perform very different 
functions in any philosophical analysis. I shall go into all this in great depth 
in the course of these essays. But for now, all that is necessary to keep in mind 
is that liberty is a complex notion, and whenever the word “liberty” is used, 
one must be careful to note which of these very different concepts of liberty 
is being employed.
It will also be important to keep in mind the difference between a concept 
of liberty and a conception.44 A concept is a more general principle, such 
as the idea that people should be free to self-actualize or be the best that 
they can be, which is what positive liberty claims. But a concept is usually 
expressed in such general terms that it may not be specific enough to tell us 
what we should do in concrete situations. Concepts often need to be further 
refined, or cashed out, before they can give us specific advice about what to 
do in the real world. There are usually many ways any particular concept 
can be cashed out, and how it is cashed out can have a dramatic effect on its 
real-world implications. Each of the various concepts of liberty that I have 
mentioned can be cashed out in a variety of ways and distinguishing between 
these differing conceptions of each concept of liberty is important. It will be 
especially important to keep in mind that my conception of republican liberty 
is very different than the conception of republican liberty that is currently 
attracting a great deal of attention in academic circles. This latter conception 
of republican liberty is very thick – that is, it has been and is being used by 
many theorists as a comprehensive principle of justice that can be applied to 
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a wide variety of specific situations. In contrast, I will be using a very thin 
conception of republican liberty – one that does not attempt to do the work 
of a comprehensive principle of justice but remains a conception of liberty 
alone. In the present context, this is an advantage not a failing, for it means 
that embracing my conception of republican liberty does not require com-
mitments that are unlikely to draw agreement from people holding a variety 
of comprehensive moral views. It can therefore be used to do things in our 
moral reasoning that a thick conception of republican liberty would be too 
controversial to do. I will talk about this more at the end of essay one, “The 
Libertarian Argument for Unions,” but I will go into it at even greater length 
in essay two, “The Union as a Basic Institution of Society.” To get the full 
picture of my conception of republican liberty, one must accordingly read the 
relevant sections in both essays.
I also want to say something about language, and especially about how 
I will refer to certain policies, practices, and forms of agreement in these 
essays and what terms I shall use to refer to them. In the debate about union-
ization, each side often uses different terms to refer to the same thing. I 
refer to “universal” unionization, but those on the right would refer to this 
as “compulsory” unionization, for “compulsory” tends to carry a negative 
connotation, while “universal,” I admit, tends to carry a positive one. Those 
on the right attack “closed shop” agreements, for most people have a posi-
tive emotional response to the idea of something being open and a negative 
one to anything being closed. However, a closed shop is one in which the 
employer has agreed to hire only those who are already members of the 
union and such agreements have been illegal in the United States since 1947. 
What many union critics actually have in mind when they refer to a closed 
shop agreement is a union shop agreement, which as I have already men-
tioned allows the employer to hire union or nonunion workers but requires 
all new currently nonunion employees to join the union and begin pay-
ing union dues shortly after being hired. Even these agreements, however, 
are not enforceable to the extent they require actual union membership, 
although many agreements still purport to require this. Employees covered 
by such agreements can therefore refuse to join the union, although they 
still must pay an “agency fee” that covers the cost of collective bargaining 
and certain other activities that directly involve the employment relationship 
but not the cost of lobbying, union organizing, or other more generalized 
activities. Union shop agreements are therefore, in effect, currently no dif-
ferent than what are expressly called “agency agreements,” which do not 
require employees to join the union and pay union dues but do require them 
to pay agency fees – often called “fair share fees” by those on the left – if 
they don’t join.45 Despite the fact that no one is being denied a job because 
of their union status under either a union shop or agency shop agreement, 
however, those on the right often decry these agreements as denying people 
the right to work. To maintain the rhetorical pretense that these agreements 
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do deny people jobs, some states have in turn banned union and agency 
shop agreements using what are expressly, though misleadingly, labeled 
“right-to-work” laws, providing that workers cannot be compelled to join a 
union nor pay union dues or even an agency fee.46 Those on the left, in turn, 
combat this rhetoric with rhetoric of their own, referring to these laws as 
“free-rider” laws, for they allow employees who benefit from unionization 
to refuse to pay for it. Because this argument proved convincing in a healthy 
minority of states, those which expressly rejected attempts to pass right-to-
work/free-rider laws, the political right then opened up a second front in 
response, recasting the practice of insisting on the mandatory payment of 
union or agency fees as “compelled speech” and arguing that, under the First 
Amendment, public sector workers should not be forced to pay for speech 
with which they may disagree. While initially unsuccessful, this argument 
has now been accepted by the Supreme Court, effectively making all states 
right-to-work states with regard to public sector workers, even those whose 
elected representatives have rejected right-to-work proposals.47
What all this means is that whatever choices one makes as to how to 
describe the various arrangements that are at issue between workers and 
employers, one is going to have to use a term that is, to some degree, loaded 
with either negative or positive connotations and therefore open oneself 
up to the charge of trying to subliminally influence how people react to a 
discussion of these issues by associating some emotional baggage with one 
view or the other. But by and large, throughout these essays, I will use the 
terms favored by the right, although I shall use the terms “closed shop” 
and “union shop” in their correct sense, despite the use of the term “closed 
shop” to refer to both kinds of practices by some of those on the right. I 
will otherwise use the terms favored by the right because these are the terms 
that are now in common use among the general public, despite the efforts 
of the left to introduce more neutral or even favorable versions of them. I 
will even use the term “compulsory unionization” in some places instead of 
“universal unionization,” despite the fact that given the arguments I present 
in these essays I believe that the term “universal” more accurately captures 
the feeling that should be associated with this practice. I will use the terms 
favored by the right because my argument is strong, and I am not afraid 
of having to overcome the rhetorical power of the more negative versions 
of these terms in the process of asserting my argument. Nevertheless, it is 
important to keep in mind the subtle influence these terms may be having 
on one’s thought processes and be especially alive to and resist the idea 
that the negative or positive connotations associated with these terms are 
justified.
I should also point out that while everything I say in these essays should 
be equally applicable to any liberal capitalist democracy, the book is pri-
marily oriented toward the situation in the United States of America. The 
same problems that have beset unions there have also arisen in many other 
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liberal capitalist democracies, of course, but nowhere else are they as severe. 
Indeed, some of the proposals I make in these essays have effectively already 
been accepted and instantiated in some liberal capitalist democracies because 
these approaches seem intuitively more plausible and appealing given the dif-
ferent cultural and historical traditions in place. Nevertheless, even though 
this book is primarily about the United States, its arguments can also be 
applied to other liberal capitalist democracies. Take, for example, the United 
Kingdom, where unionization has also been dramatically declining for many 
years and for many of the same reasons that apply in the United States. While 
I do not discuss the UK situation in anywhere near the detail that I discuss 
the situation in the United States, the application of my arguments to what is 
happening in the United Kingdom should be obvious. Moreover, even those 
residing in the countries of Northern Europe, where unionization is already 
close to being institutionalized, should be able to draw something from my 
discussion. Unionization is under attack even in these countries, and under-
standing how unionization can be supported by the argument from liberty 
should accordingly be helpful in resisting attempts to roll back the clock in 
Northern Europe too.
Finally, it may also be helpful to mention that just because my argument 
focuses on the application of the argument from liberty to unionization, this 
does not mean that it will not generalize and apply to other issues of contem-
porary import. The argument from liberty is currently being used by those 
on the right to push back against all sorts of achievements of the liberal state 
that have been driven mostly by the argument from equality. Indeed, the argu-
ment from liberty is being used against almost every progressive proposal cur-
rently in play, from prohibiting discrimination against LGBT people, to the 
mandatory purchase of health insurance, to almost every attempt at govern-
ment regulation to protect our health and safety as well as the environment, 
to attempts to regulate the financial industry, to what kinds of limits may 
be placed on campaign contributions, and so on.48 But as Emile Durkheim 
pointed out more than 100 years ago
Nothing is more false than the antimony that people have too often wished to establish 
between the authority of rules and the freedom of the individual. On the contrary, lib-
erty (by which we mean a just liberty, one for which society is duty bound to enforce 
respect) is itself the product of a set of rules. I can be free only in so far as the other 
person is prevented from turning to his own benefit that superiority, whether physical, 
economic or of any other kind, which he possesses, in order to fetter my liberty. Only 
a social rule can serve as a barrier against such abuses of power.49
Without such rules, complex as they may need to be, whatever liberty remains 
“is purely nominal,” Durkheim then went on to say.50 Gaining a deeper under-
standing of how complex the idea of liberty is, what kinds of liberty a liberal 
democracy is designed to promote and protect, and how the promotion and 
protection of certain kinds of liberty may actually undermine the kinds of 
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liberty that most of us hold dear is therefore critical if we are to meaningfully 
engage with one of the key arguments currently being used in a wide variety 
of public policy debates. By reclaiming the argument of liberty from the right 
with regard to unionization in this work, those who are so inclined should be 
able to draw arguments to defend a wide variety of progressive policies that 
currently rely exclusively on the argument from equality and may be founder-
ing as a result.
With these points in mind, our journey toward universal unionization is 
now ready to begin.
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in general, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 101, 186, 235
in minimal state, 21, 28, 35, 36, 40, 41, 186
monopolization, 36, 37, 132
price-fixing, 36
secondary boycotts, 41
unionization as, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 
118, 153, 254
anti-liberalism, 270
anti-Semitism, 143
antisocial behavior
by management, 142, 143
and unionization, 67, 101, 102, 140,  
143, 157
by unions, 143
antitrust laws, 36, 41, 125, 151, 162, 172, 235
anti-union legislation, 5, 170, 230
arbitrariness
defined, 89, 266
and failure to take interests or opinions 
into account, 91
in general, 14, 57, 58, 64, 78, 86, 88, 89, 
90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 101, 106, 118, 120, 
121, 122, 126, 146, 148, 149, 153, 158, 
174, 176, 205, 207, 235, 236, 237
and intent, 91
and republican liberty, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 
93, 183
arbitration, 112, 113
austerity, 172, 178, 197, 205
automation. See technological innovation
background justice, 11, 64, 75, 78, 82, 84, 
111, 119, 153, 156
bankruptcy, 3, 13, 171, 207, 224, 226,  
229, 231
as allegedly caused by excessive salaries 
and pensions, 222
of Detroit, 196
of public entities, 225, 321
individuals who pay even after  
discharge, 337
basic institutions
and basic structure, 67, 68, 72, 83
central banks as, 165
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definition of, 13, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 78, 79, 
80, 82, 90, 152, 164
firms as, 143
free press as, 165
moral evaluation of, 67, 68, 71, 73, 76, 78, 
79, 80, 83, 85, 90, 95, 102, 104, 151, 
205, 237
and post-institutional rights, 103
Rawls on, 67, 72, 74, 76, 84
religious institutions as, 166
slavery as, 80
unions as, 11, 12, 13, 63, 64, 66, 67, 82, 
83, 84, 86, 87, 102, 103, 104, 109, 110, 
120, 124, 127, 128, 131, 139, 144, 149, 
150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 161, 163, 
164, 237, 238
basic structure, 63, 66, 67, 69, 72, 73, 74, 76, 
79, 80, 83, 105, 106, 124, 143, 146
and basic institutions compared, 72, 73
functionality of, 73
moral evaluation of, 69, 70, 71
Rawls on, 63, 67, 68, 71, 74, 75, 76, 84, 
97, 261
and well-ordered society, 71
Bentham, Jeremy, 84
Berlin, Isaiah, 14, 55
Bevin, Matt, 202
Black, Marina, 228
Black Lives Matter, 151
boards of directors and supervision of 
management, 137, 138
Bonar, James, 135
Brave New World, 70
Brexit, 172, 195, 214, 262, 269
Brownback, Sam, 197
Buchanan, James, 23
burden of the risk of error, 109, 149
burdens of judgment, 90, 108
capitalism
in general, 70, 71, 72, 79, 81, 82, 83, 95, 
102, 193, 209
laissez faire, 71, 187
welfare state, 71, 72
Carter, Jimmy, 219
categorical imperative, 81
Catholic Church on economic freedom, 99
Cato Institute, 182
causation, 2, 8, 51, 85, 103, 118, 136, 145, 177, 
179, 180, 181, 184, 196, 202, 203, 222
central banks as basic institutions, 165, 166
charter schools, 215
Citizens United, 213
Clark, John Bates, 75
Clark, John M., 72
Clinton, Hillary, 212
closed shop agreements, 15, 16, 153
Coase, Ronald, 27, 28
codetermination, 123
Cohen, G. A., 24
collective action problems, 21
collective bargaining
arguments against, 13, 22, 41, 203, 204, 
205, 208, 211, 219
as core function of unions, 13, 66, 158, 
203, 205
cost of, 15, 24, 57, 171, 232, 236, 237
and free association, 205
and free speech, 233
in general, 7, 12, 34, 40, 46, 66, 133, 140, 
154, 163, 207, 208, 210
Nixon on, 11
by public employees, 204, 207, 209, 210, 
218, 230, 325, 326
right to, 3, 4, 11, 144, 170, 175, 204, 205, 
207, 208, 220, 222, 227
and strikes, 204
as undemocratic, 205, 219, 220
collective responsibility, 236
common good, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 42, 64,  
65, 97, 171, 191, 206, 207, 212
Commons, John R., 72
communism, 86, 100, 166
commutative justice, 5, 6
compelled speech, 16, 171, 230, 231,  
234, 235
compulsory unionization. See universal 
unionization
conceptions of the good, 30, 43, 58,  
105, 208
concepts and conceptions, distinction 
between, 14
consequentialist arguments, 4, 8
and arguments from right distinguished, 
8, 9, 65
and unionization, 3, 6, 8, 30, 42, 43, 127
corporate governance as check on 
management incompetence, 137, 138
corporatism, 72
corral the beast, 4
corruption, 64, 66, 101, 102, 128, 139, 144, 
148, 149, 191, 196, 215, 218, 227
within unions, 128
basic institutions (cont.)
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cost-benefit analysis, difficulty of, 194, 195
counterfactual comparisons, nature of, 103
deep state, 221
demagogues, 146
democracy, 17, 59, 70, 71, 72, 122, 123, 165, 
198, 210, 213, 214, 216, 219, 222, 237
direct, 215
representative, 215
Democratic Party and unionization, 170, 
175, 208, 209, 217
democratic socialism, as distinguished from 
capitalism, 71
desert as theory of justice, 265
Detroit, 197, 230
bankruptcy, 196
de-unionization, effects of, 155
difference principle, 4, 24, 64, 68, 85, 152
dissatisfaction effect, 119
distinctness of persons, 81
distributive justice, 3, 5, 56, 74, 152
division of labor, 26, 41, 48
dominant protective association, 21, 26,  
29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 41, 42, 43,  
44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 58, 
107, 126, 205
membership in, 47
unionization of, 45
domination
and negative liberty, 106
and republican liberty, 14, 57, 58, 86, 95, 
96, 99, 106, 118, 120, 125, 148, 149, 
154, 183, 187
Douglas, Paul, 121
due process, 92
substantive versus procedural, 92
Durkheim, Emile, 17, 145
and distinction between mechanical 
solidarity and organic solidarity, 145
on unions as source of organic  
solidarity, 146
Economic Freedom Index (EFI), 182, 184
economic growth and unionization, 94, 115, 
116, 127, 136, 197
economic inequality
and exploitation, 6, 187
in general, 2, 4, 5, 6, 85, 115, 116, 119, 
135, 183
and unionization, 1–2, 4, 5, 67, 85, 115, 
116, 120
as violation of right, 5
economic liberty, 24, 66, 94, 100, 101, 104, 
139, 148, 181, 185, 188, 211
connection with political liberty, 94, 
109–10, 181, 184, 189, 190
connection with positive liberty, 181
not a right, 94
efficiency. See also Kaldor-Hicks efficiency; 
Pareto efficiency
and anticompetitive behavior, 101
and externalities, 128
and firm, 29, 97, 98, 137, 138
Kaldor Hicks versus Pareto, 104
and liberty, 94, 98
macroeconomic, 137
microeconomic, 120
and morality, 30, 75, 76, 98, 109, 119, 190
and privatization, 191
and proper size of government, 192, 193, 194
and social costs, 270
and unions, 102, 109, 118–19, 120, 126, 
131, 134, 139, 140, 148
employee tenure, 118
Enlightenment, 7, 13
Equal Rights Amendment, 151
equality
argument from, 4, 5, 6, 7, 17, 18, 86, 87, 
104, 119, 120, 151, 177
and exploitation, 173
in general, 3, 5, 6, 7, 34, 56, 64, 66, 83, 
84–85, 86, 87, 103, 104, 119, 121, 124, 
151, 152, 176, 184, 192, 208, 212, 237
meaning of, 152
right to, 4, 7
essential services, 13, 171, 196, 200, 201, 
203, 323
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to 
Declines in Firms, 117
exploitation, 6, 64, 85, 101, 113, 127, 128, 
133, 163, 173, 183, 186, 187, 197–98, 
206, 208, 285
and economic inequality, 187
of foreign workers, 139
of independent contractors, 160
and monopsony, 39
by non-unionized firms, 1, 49
and profitability, 127
and unionization, 122, 127, 238
and voluntariness, 78
Exploitation and Economic Justice in the 
Liberal Capitalist State, 75, 77
external preferences, 64, 260
externalities, 102, 128, 140, 183, 187, 198
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fair share fees. See agency fees
farm workers, 309
fascism, 99, 182, 211, 215
fast-food workers, 40, 112, 162
feasibility constraint, 10, 25, 29, 75, 80, 82, 
98, 102, 103–4, 120, 144, 155, 156,  
159, 213
Feinberg, Joel, 51
financial crisis of 2008, 101. See also Great 
Recession
firm size, 27, 28, 98
and economies of scale, 28
limits on, 29
firms
anticompetitive behavior of, 36
and appropriation of surplus value, 32
as basic form of business organization, 
12–13
bargaining power of, 29
Coase on, 268
and divison of labor, 26
external checks on behavior of, 101
hierarchical structure of, 96, 97, 122
justification for, 27, 96, 97, 102,  
126, 139
in libertarian utopia, 23
regulation of, 22
relationship with independent contractors, 
50, 57
remedies against, 58
and suppression of price mechanism, 27, 95
as threat to liberty, 66, 97, 98, 99, 101, 
102, 110, 120, 123, 141
unionization of, 22, 54, 137, 138, 149,  
150, 163
First Amendment, 16, 171, 172, 230, 231, 
232, 233, 234, 238. See also free speech
weaponizing of, 237
foreign workers, 125, 139
France, 83, 145, 172
franchise agreements, no poaching clauses, 162
Fraser Institute, 182
fraud, 21, 36, 55, 101, 128, 142, 143, 183, 
186, 224, 225, 227
uncovering of, 142
free market, 12, 22, 36, 37, 38, 79, 82, 94, 95, 
97, 102, 121, 137, 180, 181–82, 187, 189, 
190, 235, 268
free press as basic institution, 164–65
free riding, 16, 45, 284
free speech, 3, 13, 64, 234
as based on equality, 265
and communicative significance, 232
money as form of, 231–32
freedom. See liberty
freedom of association, 3, 4, 6, 26, 31, 33, 
34, 35, 43, 46, 52–53, 54, 64, 83, 84, 
204, 205
as based on equality, 265
does not include right to not associate, 53
freedom of contract, 26, 31, 35, 64, 94, 223, 230
freedom of religion, 53
Freeman, Richard B., 111, 112, 115, 116, 117, 
118, 119, 124, 128
Freeman, Samuel, 67
friction, defined, 28
Friedman, Milton, 136, 290
Fuller, Lon
on basic institutions, 264
fundamental moral presuppositions, 9, 38, 211
Galbraith, John Kenneth, 121
and concept of countervailing power, 121
game theory, 8, 125, 263
gay marriage, 234
Germany, 72, 83, 99, 123, 145, 148, 149, 
163, 298
and use of works councils, 149
gerrymandering, 213
gig economy, 160, 162
Gilded Age, 199
globalization and unionization, 125
government shutdown of February 2019,  
178, 201
Great Depression, 85
Great Recession, 115–16, 165, 169, 178–79, 
205, 207, 229. See also financial crisis 
of 2008
Hamilton, Walter, 72
Hart, H. L. A., 69, 78
Hayek, Friedrich, 23, 100, 129, 131, 136, 
140, 181, 188
fear of socialism, 256
on public education, 188
on unemployment, 188
health care, 113, 175
health insurance and unionization, 17, 113, 
114, 236
heavy manufacturing, shift of jobs overseas, 1
Hill, Joe, 81
Hitchman Coal & Coke Company v. 
Mitchell, 31
Hitler, Adolph, 99, 148, 198
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Hobbes, Thomas, 69
Hobbs Act, 129, 286
home-care workers, 309
human capital, 95
Human Freedom Index (HFI), 182, 183, 184
human nature, 8, 10, 25, 69, 84
human rights, 84
Hutt, William H., 100, 295
Huxley, Aldous, 70, 119
hypocrisy, 223, 331
hypothetical consent, 150, 151
moral force of, 97, 235
ideal theory, 10, 25
and non-ideal theory contrasted, 10
immigration policy, 324–25
incompetence of management, 64, 66, 67, 
101, 102, 137, 138, 139–40, 144, 193
independent contractors
as employees, 25, 160, 161, 162
and employees compared, 57
independents
as free riders, 45, 46, 284
in minimal state, 21, 46–47, 48–49, 50, 52, 
54, 107, 126
within firm, 51
within union, 45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 54, 126
individual right, 5, 9, 54, 64, 83, 84, 85
argument from, 5
industrial relations, 7, 65
inflation
Friedman on, 136, 290
and unionization, 67, 115, 133, 134, 135, 
136, 137
and wages fund theory, 134–35
inherently governmental functions, 192, 320
institutionalism, 72, 187, 262
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 191–92, 193
invisible hand, 268
James, Lebron, 96
Janus v. AFSCME, 65, 144, 170, 231, 232, 
233, 234, 236–37
job security, 2, 138, 142
joint employees, classifciation as, 162
just price, doctrine of, 207, 285
justice as fairness, principles of, 24, 63, 64, 
76, 85, 263
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109
and measuring improvements in risk 
environment, 107, 108, 109
Kalecki, Michal, 132
Kansas, 197
supply-side tax experiment, 197
Keynes, John Maynard, 131, 132, 207
King, Martin Luther Jr.
on sanitation workers strike, 173
on unions, 114
kleptocrats, 99
knowledge problem, 249
Koch, Charles, 23, 182
Koch, David, 23, 182
Koch Brothers, 199
la secte, 221
labor economics, 7, 65
labor market
defined, 37, 38, 39, 40, 121, 132,  
133, 160
and perfect competition, 37
laissez faire, 71, 187
law of conservation of liberty, 104, 105, 259
Le Pen, Marine, 145
left-libertarianism. See under libertarianism
leveling down, 206
LGBT people, 17, 141
liberal capitalist democracy, 11, 12, 16, 59, 
100, 110–11, 171, 238
liberal egalitarianism, 3, 4, 13, 64, 82
liberal political theory and neglect of 
unionization, 8
libertarian utopia
arguments available in, 30–31, 51–52, 208
firm size in, 28
free-riding in, 47
government regulation in, 182, 186, 195
membership in dominant protective 
association, 47, 107, 126
and negative liberty, 57
and republican liberty, 58
rise of firms in, 29
role of dominant protective association in, 
21, 26
union shop agreements in, 51, 238
unionization in, 32, 35, 42, 45, 46, 48, 54, 
57, 58, 59, 238
unionization of dominant protective 
association in, 42, 43, 44, 45
yellow dog contracts in, 31, 32, 33, 34, 54
libertarianism
among general public, 23, 55
and anarchism distinguished, 54, 235
and arguments for common good, 42
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attitude toward anticompetitive behavior, 
28, 35, 36, 40, 41
and Charles and David Koch, 23
faux, 23
and free association, 34, 52, 54
hybird, consequentilaist, and deontological 
libertarianism compared, 36
and James Buchanan, 23
left, 13, 22, 246, 247
in libertarian utopia, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 
27, 28, 29
and market regulation, 22
and minimal state, 42
and negative liberty, 55, 56
and neoliberalism distinguished, 24
and noncompete agreements, 40
not plea for return to agrarian form of life, 
25–26
Nozick on, 21
and Rand Paul, 23
and redistribution of wealth, 22
and republican liberty, 57, 58
right, 13, 22, 23, 126, 129, 182
and right to equal treatment, 33
and rights as side-constraints, 3
and slavery, 32
and union shop agreements, 54, 57, 58
and unionization, 12, 22, 23, 34, 42, 59, 
82, 238
liberty. See also economic liberty; negative 
liberty; political liberty; positive liberty
anti-union argument from, 2, 3, 6, 13, 23, 
24, 25, 86, 100, 125, 141, 151, 178
and argument against slavery, 119
as argument from right, 5, 6
and collective responsibility, 236
conflict with equality, 6, 153
and democracy, 215, 216, 237
Durkheim on, 17
and efficiency, 190
and exploitation, 173
and firm, 96
forms of, 109
and free speech, 230, 231, 236
and freedom of association, 53
in general, 2, 7, 9, 13, 14, 38, 66, 83, 84, 
85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 94, 95, 104, 105, 
119, 147, 212
general right to, 2, 8, 10, 56
Hohfeld on, 53
and LGBT rights, 234
in libertarian utopia, 12, 31, 36, 55, 56, 57, 
58, 59
pre-institutional concept of, 64, 103
pro-union argument from, 7, 17, 95, 98, 
99, 100, 101, 102, 124, 133, 148, 154, 
158, 159
and small government argument, 171, 172, 
173, 177, 180, 182, 184, 185, 192, 196, 
198, 199, 210, 222, 223
strikes to essential services as threat to, 200
threats by private parties to, 199, 236
and union shop agreements, 57
and voice, 120
Liberty League, 85
Lipset, Seymour Martin, 147
living wage, 112, 113, 157, 195
long-term agreements and inter-
adminsitration bindingness, 220
Los Angeles School Board, 215
luck egalitarianism, 4, 5, 64, 85
Machlup, Fritz, 100
macroeconomic effects of unionization, 115, 
120, 131, 134, 135, 136, 137
Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 204
Maistre, Joseph de, 221
marginal net productivity of labor, 75
market failures, 186, 187
market socialism. See democratic socialism as 
distinguished from capitalism
Marshall, Alfred, 27, 75
Medoff, James, 111, 112, 115, 116, 117, 118, 
119, 124, 128
Memphis, 173, 174
Mercer, Rebecca, 199
Mercer, Robert, 199
microeconomic economic effects of 
unionization, 120
middle class, 112, 115, 146, 206, 216
Mill, J. S., 134, 135
minimal state, 21, 35, 36, 43, 47, 54, 186, 
190, 222
and modern capitalist state compared, 22
minimum wage, 112, 113, 133, 136, 140, 160, 
161, 204
minorities and women, and unionization, 176
Mises, Ludwig von, 37, 100, 129
Mitchell, Wesley, 72
monopoly profits and wages, 28, 117, 124
monopsony, 38, 39, 40, 148
mountain cabin hypothetical, 51
multiplier effect, 207
libertarianism (cont.)
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Murray, Charles, 333
Mussolini, Benito, 99
National Labor Relations Board, 161
Nazis, 99
negative liberty
Berlin on, 14, 55
definition of, 55, 86
and economic liberty, 94, 104
and efficiency, 97, 98
equality of, 56, 87
and firm, 98, 99, 102
justification for interference with, 88, 105, 
109, 134, 237
measurement of, 104, 105, 183
minimum required, 56, 57
as moral notion, 86, 98
no general right to, 56, 126, 140
and other forms of liberty, 66, 87
Petro on, 211
and republican liberty, 94, 95, 97, 106, 107
and unionization, 125, 126, 139, 148, 237
and voluntariness, 95
neoliberalism, 12, 22, 24, 94, 99, 100, 129, 
181, 188, 190, 195, 197, 198
neutrality, 66, 89, 104, 123, 185, 208, 209, 210
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 211
Nixon, Richard, 11, 209
no friend, 136
noncompete agreements, 39, 40
non-disparagement agreements, 141
non-ideal theory and ideal theory  
contrasted, 10
Norris–LaGuardia Act, 31
Nozick, Robert, 3, 21, 33, 35, 46, 47, 48, 49, 
52, 54, 56, 76, 126, 190
Obama, Barack, 113, 161, 162, 219, 231
oligopoly, 38, 39
oligopsony, 39, 148
ordoliberalism, 99, 100, 198
original position, 97, 269
overlapping consensus, 214
Pareto efficiency, 104, 105, 106, 107
and measuring improvements in risk 
environment, 107, 109
Paul, Rand, 23
pensions, 206, 222, 223, 225, 226, 227, 228, 
229, 230
as allegedly excessive, 223, 228, 229
average for public employees, 226, 227
constitutional protection of, 225, 229
for Los Angeles city employees, 228
public and private compared, 228
for public school teachers, 229
when irresponsibly managed, 225
perfect competition, defined, 37
perfectionism, 82, 296
Petro, Sylvester, 100, 129, 210, 211, 212, 218
Pettit, Philip, 88, 89, 96
Pigou, A. C., 75
plutocrats, 99
police unions, behavior of, 157
political liberalism, 72, 82, 101, 210, 236
political liberty, 24, 94, 100, 101, 110, 178, 
180, 181, 184, 185, 189, 190
Ponzi scheme and pension funds, 225
Porter hypothesis, 267
positive liberty, 14, 66, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 
104, 126, 127, 183
and fascism, 211
post-institutional regulation, 11, 13, 63, 66, 
85, 98, 103, 109, 139, 144, 149, 152, 153, 
163, 192, 200
poverty line, 113
Powell Memo, 11, 245
pre-institutional rights, 83, 84, 104, 265
price mechanism, 27, 41, 82, 95
prioritarianism, 13
prisons, understaffing and brutality  
of, 179, 191
private sector unionization
and antisocial behavior by unions, 143
and background justice, 12
and back-to-work orders, 200
as basic institution, 12, 13, 65, 238
and distribution of surplus value, 173
effect of globalization and automation, 212
effect of strikes, 202
effect on wages, 112, 114
and employee-owned firms, 217
and expenditure on research and 
development, 281
and exploitation, 173, 206
and hierarchical structure of firm, 157
history of, 169
in libertarian utopia, 42, 43, 44, 58
and minorities and women, 176
outside of US, 172
and political influence, 176
rates of, 133, 169, 170, 211
and retirement benefits, 223, 227
and right to bargain collectively, 208
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and right-to-work laws, 170
and taxpayers, 208
and yellow dog contracts, 31, 43, 44
privately held corporations and supervision  
of management, 138
privatization, 172, 190, 191, 192, 193
procedural justice, 73, 75, 76, 78
imperfect, 76
perfect, 73, 74, 76, 77
pure, 74, 75, 76, 77, 263
and substantive justice distinguished, 73, 79
product market, defined, 37, 38, 39, 132, 136
product prices, stickiness of, 132, 288
productivity and unionization, 26, 67, 75, 
112, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 132, 
133, 134, 137, 148, 174, 189
Professional Air Traffic Controllers 
Organization (PATCO) 1981 strike, 201
profitability and unionization, 67, 117, 118, 
124, 127, 128, 142, 191
property-owning democracy, defined, 71
protective services, provision of, 21, 46,  
47, 48, 49
public agencies, hierarchical structure of, 174
public education, 183, 187, 197, 202, 226
public employment, rate of growth, 178, 180
public sector unionization
and allegedly excessive public salaries and 
benefits, 44, 114, 158, 171, 196, 206, 
207, 228, 229
as allegedly undemocratic, 13, 145, 158, 
170, 171, 176, 181, 208, 209, 211, 212, 
215, 217, 218, 221, 226
and antisocial behavior by  
management, 143
and antisocial behavior by unions, 143, 157
and argument from equality, 177
and argument from liberty, 3, 7, 13, 59, 
171, 231, 237, 238
as check on management behavior, 175
and consequentialist arguments, 4, 42
and corruption, 218, 227
differences with private sector, 13, 65, 157, 
158, 169, 171, 173, 174, 176, 177, 190, 
212, 228, 238
effect of Janus decision on, 170, 231, 236
and essential services, 200
and exploitation, 173, 206
and free speech, 3, 16, 230, 231, 233
history of, 169
increased importance of, 170
in libertarian utopia, 12, 42, 44, 45,  
58, 238
and minorities and women, 176, 177, 211
outside of US, 172
Petro on, 210
and public debt, 172, 196, 197, 222
public employees like shareholders, 175
rates of, 4, 169, 170, 211, 212, 228
and right to bargain collectively, 3, 204, 
205, 208, 222, 227
and right to strike, 200, 201, 202, 203
and right to work, 16, 65, 230
and size of public workforce, 169, 177, 
178, 180
and small government argument, 3, 171, 
177, 179, 180, 182, 190, 194, 199
special arguments against, 65, 169, 170, 
171, 173
and teacher strikes, 202
and yellow dog contracts, 31, 43
Putin, Vladimir, 99
quit rates, 118, 119
Rawls, John, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 24, 63, 67, 68, 69, 71, 
72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 84, 85, 89, 
90, 96, 97, 102, 108, 109, 153, 208, 214
on unions, 63, 244
Reagan, Ronald, 185, 201
reciprocity as moral doctrine, 77
religious institutions as basic institutions, 166
religious liberty, 234
rent-control, 209
replacement workers, use of, 131, 163, 201
republican liberty. See also arbitrariness; 
domination
and agency fees, 236, 237
and arbitrariness, 58, 88, 91, 120
and collective bargaining in public  
sector, 205
and concentrations of economic power, 99
as countervailing power, 121
definition of, 14, 57, 86, 92
and discrimination, 176, 177, 237, 238
and domination, 57
and efficiency, 97, 98
and exploitation, 208
and firm, 96, 97, 98, 110, 141
and free speech, 234, 235
and happiness, 119
and libertarianism, 58
measurement of, 106
private sector unionization (cont.)
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and negative liberty, 88, 96
no dependence requirement, 93
no intent requirement, 90
no participation requirement, 93, 123
and other forms of liberty, 66
Petro on, 211
and public agencies, 174
and religious institutions, 166
as right, 58, 126, 140, 205
Senator Paul Douglass on, 121
and taxpayers, 205, 206, 207
thin conception of, 14, 89, 93, 259
and unionization, 59, 94, 102, 104, 106, 
109, 110, 122, 126, 128, 134, 146, 148, 
153, 154, 238
US Supreme Court on, 120, 121
and voice, 118
and workplace democracy, 122, 123
Republican party, 14, 23, 87, 88, 100, 170, 
172, 175, 202, 208, 209, 212, 213
restaurant workers, special rules for, 163
right libertarianism. See under  
libertarianism
right-to-work, 12, 15, 16, 23, 24, 46, 54, 65, 
103, 112, 127, 154, 170, 171, 197, 230, 
232, 236, 237
rights
as distinguished from liberties, 53
infringing versus violating, 51
pre-institutional versus 
post-institutional, 83
as side-constraints, 52
risk
and burden of risk of error, 109
measuring improvements in risk 
environment, 107, 108, 109
and morality, 107
treatement of implausible risk, 108
trivial risks to be disregarded, 108
risk aversion and firm size, 29
risky behavior as rights violation, 46, 47, 48, 
49, 50, 107, 126
Rizzo, Robert, 227
Robinson, Joan, 75
Rothbard, Murray, 37, 258
sanitation workers, 173
Saudi Arabia, 91
Seattle study on effect of raising minimum 
wage, 133
Securities Exchange Commission  
(SEC), 142
self-ownership, 56, 57, 58, 86, 110, 120, 134
and ownership of one’s labor, 38
sexual harassment, 285
shareholders
and supervision of directors, 137
and supervision of management, 137, 138
Skinner, Quentin, 88, 89
slavery, 14, 31, 32, 80, 81, 96, 119, 127, 198
and argument from liberty, 119
slaves, 81, 198, 211
slippery slope arguments, 94, 110, 181,  
189, 190
small government argument, 3, 13, 171, 172, 
177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 
186, 188, 189, 190, 193, 194, 195, 196, 
197, 198, 199, 210, 222, 315
Smith, Adam, 96, 180, 181, 185
social cooperation, 63, 67, 69, 81, 84, 98
social solidarity
effect of oxytocin on, 147
unions as source of, 145, 146, 296
socialism, 27, 70, 71, 79, 95, 100, 170,  
189, 193
socialist society, heirarchical structure  
of, 137
Spengler, Oswald, 211
starve the beast, 4, 222
State Policy Network (SPN), 202
Steiner, Hillel, 104, 258
Stewart, Walter, 72
strains of commitment, 214
strict egalitarianism, 4
strict liability for violations of republican 
liberty, 90
strike, right to, 4, 44, 49, 125, 130, 162, 170, 
171, 173, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 209
substantive justice, 73, 76, 93
sufficientarianism, 13
supply-side economics, 197
Supreme Court, United States, 11, 16, 31, 65, 
112, 120, 129, 170, 197, 204, 213, 229, 
231, 232
surplus value, 29, 32, 173, 249
Taylor, Charles, 86, 183
teacher unions, 157, 229
technological innovation, 1, 41, 94, 139
theft, 21, 36, 55, 101, 186
A Theory of Justice, 71
thin theory of the good, concept of, 30, 44, 
58, 89, 93, 127
thin versus thick conceptions, 15
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108849784.007
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UC Davis, on 23 Apr 2020 at 17:27:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
416 Index
Thomson, Judith, 51
on difference between violating and 
infringing a right, 51
traditional conservativism, 13
Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), 125
transaction costs, 27, 37, 39, 118, 137, 191
Trump, Donald, 1, 100, 113, 117, 125,  
140, 145, 146, 161, 162, 165, 170,  
178, 187, 209, 212, 219, 221, 231,  
324, 328
Uber, 160, 161
underemployment, 50, 101
unemployment, 2, 132, 160, 174, 187
and deficiencies in aggregate demand, 132
Hayek on, 188
and minimum wage, 133
neoclassical view, 132
and real wages, 131, 132
since Great Recession, 2, 100, 116
and unionization, 1, 2, 67, 114, 131, 132, 
133, 135, 152, 157
and wages fund theory, 134
union certification as political campaign, 
150, 151
union dues, 3, 4, 6, 11, 12, 15, 22, 44, 45,  
46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 57, 63, 103, 144, 
164, 232. See also agency fees
union shop, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 24, 34, 46, 50, 
54, 55, 57, 58, 112, 154, 238
union shop agreements, 24, 49, 50, 51,  
54, 153
unionization rates
in Denmark, 150
in Finland, 150
in general, 1, 146, 159, 180
in Germany, 149
and inequality, 116
and non-union wages, 112
in Norway, 150
in private sector, 133, 169, 170, 211, 228
and productivity, 150
in public sector, 169, 170, 211, 222
in Sweden, 150
in United Kingdom, 1
in US, 1, 4, 111, 170, 211
unions. See also private sector unionization; 
public sector unionization; union dues; 
universal unionization
and alleged special privileges, 151, 152, 301
as check on antisocial inclinations of 
boards and management, 142
as check on authoritarian inclinations of 
working class, 145
as check on management incompetence, 
138
core functions of, 11, 66, 143, 144, 154, 
158, 203, 205
and democracy, 3, 12, 148, 171, 176, 205, 
209, 212, 213, 217, 218, 237
and economic efficiency, 139
and enforcement of labor  
regulations, 140, 141
Friedman on, 290
and movement of jobs overseas, 1, 139
support for Trump, 328
tendency to be protectionist, 139
use of rhetoric by and against, 15
and white-collar workers, 158, 159
unitary executive, 323
United Kingdom, 1, 17, 83, 114, 143, 157, 
172, 184, 191, 195, 209
United States v. Emmons, 129
universal basic income, 156
universal unionization, 3, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 
18, 103, 125, 142, 152, 153
and antisocial behavior by unions, 143
and argument from equality, 104
and argument from liberty, 2, 3, 8, 22, 23, 
58, 59, 110, 125, 126, 148
and background justice, 11, 64
as basic institution, 103
as building sense of community, 126
and difference principle, 152
effect on productivity, 148
effect on violence, 131
and elimination of competitive advantage 
for non-union firms, 125, 155
exception for firms with less than 50 
employees, 160
feasibility constraints on, 10, 154, 155, 158, 
159, 163
and globalization, 125
and independent contractors, 161
in libertarian utopia, 102
in other liberal capitalist democracies, 13
in private sector, 65
and replacement workers, 163
right to, 7, 13
and right to bargain collectively, 205
and UBI, 156
and workplace democracy, 122
unreasonable restraints on trade, 41
utilitarianism, 3, 77
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108849784.007
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UC Davis, on 23 Apr 2020 at 17:27:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
417Index
Veblen, Thorstein, 72
veil of ignorance, 97, 148, 235
violence
and economic coercion distinguished, 35
and factory closures, 131
and Hobbs Act, 129
by management, 130
and minimal state, 186
protection of free market from, 36
by unions, 129, 130, 151, 287
and universal unionization, 131
voice and unionization, 66, 67, 93, 116, 117, 
118, 119, 120, 122, 138, 143, 144, 159, 
165, 196, 212, 213, 215, 217, 233, 237
voluntariness, 66, 77, 78, 95
Voting Rights Act, 151
wage inequality in general, 114, 116
wage theft, 112, 113
wages
effect of noncompete agreements on, 40
effect of right-to-work laws on, 57
effect of unionization on, 2, 30, 37, 40,  
67, 112, 113, 116, 118, 124, 127, 133, 
158, 175, 196
and externalities, 142
as marginal net product of labor, 75
for minorities and women, 176
money, 131, 134
and monopoly profits, 124
poverty level, 114
and profitability, 138
public and private compared, 44
real, 1, 115, 132, 134, 135, 136
set in product market, 132
stagnancy of, 159
stickiness of, 131, 132, 134, 220, 334
for teachers, 202
and UBI, 156
union and non-union compared, 112, 155, 
206, 228
wages fund theory, 134, 135, 136
Mill on, 135
revival of, 136
Walker, Scott, 170
well-ordered society, 71, 261
West Virginia teachers strike, 45, 201,  
203, 204
and similar strikes in other states, 325–26
What Do Unions Do?, 111
whistle blowers, 142, 143
retaliation against, 142
Wilt Chamberlain example, 76
Wisconsin ban on collective bargaining by 
public employees, 170, 175, 204, 205
working conditions, 2, 30, 33, 39, 42,  
57, 66, 101, 142, 144, 156, 158,  
159, 204
work-life balance, 113
workplace democracy, 122, 123, 155, 282
yellow dog contracts, 24, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 
43, 44, 54, 256
confidentiality agreements, 33
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108849784.007
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UC Davis, on 23 Apr 2020 at 17:27:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
